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INTRODUCTION
[1]
Sexual exploitation of children is a real and disturbing problem.
However, when it comes to the sentencing of child pornography
possessors, the U.S. federal system has a problem, as well. This Article
adds to the current, heated discussion on what is happening in the
sentencing of federal child pornography possession offenses, why nobody
is satisfied, and how much the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are to
blame. At the heart of this Article are the forgotten players in the
discussion—computers and the Internet—and their role in changing the
realities of child pornography possession. This Article argues that
computers and the Internet are important factors in understanding both the
victimization of the children portrayed in the illegal images and the
formulation of appropriate punishment for those who view and possess
such images. Discussion on the topic thus far has failed to pay proper
attention to the effect computer behavior and the Internet have on the
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manner in which offenders possess child pornography and to the type and
extent of punishment that is appropriate, given the characteristics of that
possession. While some district judges are thinking about these issues
when they impose sentences, they have little guidance from experts in the
fields of punishment and sexual crimes because sentencing guidance
provided to judges has largely been restricted to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. In promulgating Guidelines for child pornography possession
offenses, the United States Sentencing Commission has largely treated the
possession offenses as traditional possession crimes, and has been
increasingly influenced by Congress’ response to political pressure to
severely punish such offenders without regard to the stated purposes of
punishment. Now that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, many
judges are forgoing the Guidelines’ advice when it comes to sentencing
the possessors of child pornography and forging out on their own. These
judges often receive criticism for being too lenient. While there may be
some truth to that assessment, what is even more apparent is that: judges
are ill-equipped to respond to the punishment needs of this group of
offenders; critics of lenient sentences often discount the faults in the
Guidelines; and the computer and Internet, the root of controversy, have
been largely overlooked in the sentencing discussion. A system reboot is
in order.
[2]
Part I of this Article will introduce the genuine problem of the
sexual exploitation of children that this country faces. It will explain the
specific federal crime of child pornography possession and the typical
methods taken to commit the crime. Part II will focus on the sentencing of
child pornography possessors, explaining the current Federal Sentencing
Guidelines approach, the rebellion of some district judges against the
Guidelines’ advisory sentencing ranges for these crimes, and the criticism
levied at those judges. Together, Parts I and II expose the system failure
that requires a rebooting of the sentencing approach. In Part III, the Article
will suggest a new manner of thinking about child pornography possession
as a computer crime that is very different from ordinary possession crimes.
This new approach seeks to understand computers and the Internet to
develop a system of punishment that will at least move toward achieving
the congressionally identified goals of punishment. Ultimately, it is neither
the purpose of this Article to suggest an appropriate range of sentences for
child pornography possession; nor is it necessarily the goal to have the
Guidelines ranges for child pornography possessors reduced. Rather, this
2
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Article emphasizes the necessity of finding a method of giving meaningful
guidance to district judges so that they are able to more appropriately
punish child pornography possessors. This is impossible to do without
making the punishment fit the specific realities of computer and Internet
crimes.
I. THE REAL HARMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION
[3]
The possession of child pornography is an offense that sheds light
on the horrific market that exists in the sexual exploitation of children.
Each image is a reminder of the abuse, molestation, and sexual
victimization of a child. Although the main purpose of this Article is to
discuss the offense of child pornography possession in particular, it is
necessary to delve into the creation and distribution of child pornography
to understand the stories behind its possession.
[4]
The Child Pornography Prevention Act defines child pornography
as “any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture,” containing sexually
explicit conduct involving a minor.1 This can range from images of
exposed genitalia to more explicit sexual abuse of children under the age
of eighteen, such as bondage or penetration by adults or objects.2 These

1

18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006). In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court
held that the ban on virtual child pornography in the CPPA was unconstitutional. 535
U.S. 234, 244–45 (2002). The Court described virtual child pornography as images “that
appear to depict minors but were produced by means other than using real children, such
as through the use of youthful-looking adults or computer-imaging technology.” Id. at
234. However, since Ashcroft, Congress has enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies & Tools
Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act). Pub. L. No.
108-21, 117 Stat 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). This Act
prohibits pornographic materials that are “indistinguishable from” child pornography. 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). This Article, however, is primarily concerned with images that do
depict real children when that can be proven.
2

Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, What is Child Pornography?,
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US
&PageId=1504 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010); see also Audrey Rogers, Child
Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 852–53 (2008) (discussing
damage caused by child pornography).
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images depict a variety of age ranges of children, including pubescent
minors, pre-pubescent minors, and even infants or toddlers.3 According to
the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, in more than half
of child pornography cases, the victimization of the children appearing in
these images resulted from acts by people they know, such as “parents,
other relatives, neighborhood/family friends, babysitters, and coaches.”4
The still image or video captures the abuse.5
[5]
Originally, distribution of child pornography took place through
real, physical images in print media; however, computers and Internet now
play a predominate role in the distribution of such images.6 It is
inexpensive to produce and memorialize child pornography on videotape,
film, CD-ROM, or DVD, to name a few formats.7 The pornographic
information can be loaded onto the creator’s computer and then distributed
via the Internet in a variety of manners, including Internet chat rooms,
instant messages, e-mail, and websites.8 While the popularity of fee based
websites has decreased among child pornography sharers, use of programs
that create peer-to-peer networks is increasing.9 These networks simplify

3

Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, supra note 2 (“Of the child pornography
victims identified by law enforcement, 42% appear to be pubescent, 52% appear to be
prepubescent, and 6% appear to be infants or toddlers.”).
4

Id.

5

See id.

6

See Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1028
(2001) (“Whereas a piece of child pornography once might have only reached a few
thousand people who bought a magazine, with the internet it can reach millions very
quickly.”).
7

Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, supra note 2.

8

Id.

9

Id.; see Lee Hollander, Tactics for Defending Computer Pornography Charges, in
STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON
ANALYZING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS, UTILIZING EXPERT WITNESSES, AND EXPLAINING
TECHNOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 57, 60–61 (Aspatore ed., 2008).
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file sharing between several individual computer users.10 Thus, the illegal
market uses the Internet both to grow and to frustrate law enforcement
efforts.
[6]
While the sexual exploitation of children occurs worldwide, it is
not necessary to look beyond the United States to gain an understanding of
the vastness of the problem. Estimates reveal that over 200,000 children in
America were at risk of commercial sexual exploitation in 2001, including
becoming victims of child pornography, juvenile prostitution, and sexual
trafficking.11 When the focus shifts to the Internet, the situation becomes
even more disturbing. A congressionally funded study conducted in 2000,
found that one in five youths between the ages ten and seventeen that
regularly use the Internet have received unwanted sexual solicitation over
the Internet.12 Further, it has been widely reported that eighty-nine percent
of sexual solicitations of youth occur in Internet chat rooms.13 The Child
Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice
(CEOS) is dedicated “to protect the welfare of America’s children and

10

For an explanation of peer-to-peer file sharing networks, see Hollander, supra note 9;
Bradley Mitchell, Introduction to Peer to Peer (P2P) Networks and Software Systems,
http://compnetworking.about.com/od/p2ppeertopeer/a/p2pintroduction.htm (last visited
March 10, 2010).
11

U.S. Dep’t of Just., Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), Child
Prostitution: Domestic Sex Trafficking of Minors, http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/ceos/prostitution.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010.); RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL
ALAN WEINER, U OF PA., COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE U.S,
CANADA AND MEXICO, 2, available at http://www.sp2.upenn.edu/~restes/CSEC_
Files/Complete_ CSEC_020220.pdf.
12

THE CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RES. CTR., ONLINE VICTIMIZATION: A REPORT ON
THE NATION’S YOUTH, http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC62.pdf.

13

See Att’y Gen. of Va., Child Internet Safety: Tips for Parents, available at
http://www.oag.state.va.us/KEY_ISSUES/PREDATORS/Internet_Tips_for_Parents.html
(last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (citing PEW Study reported in Journal of the American
Medical Association); see also Donna Rice Hughes, Sexual Predators Online, available
at http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/onlinepred.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2010);
GuardChild.Com, Internet Statistics, http://www.guardchild.com/statistics.php (last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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communities by enforcing federal criminal statutes relating to the
exploitation of children and obscenity.”14 CEOS worries that the Internet
has made certain crimes against children, especially child pornography
crimes, easier to commit but harder to prevent,.15
[7]
Certainly, when the focus shifts from other sexual exploitation
crimes against children to the child pornography market in particular, the
impact of the Internet is overwhelming. This huge, illegal industry is
prolific on the Internet, with at least 100,000 websites containing child
pornography.16 Data reveals that the websites exist to feed a very real
market for child pornography. For instance, the file-sharing network
Gnutella has reported receiving 116,000 requests for child pornography.17
Further, the child pornography industry’s annual revenue is estimated to
be approximately three billion dollars.18 It is an undeniable fact that the
development, distribution, and possession of child pornography are real,
far-reaching problems. Therefore, it is quite easy to justify the time and

14

U.S. Dep’t of Just., Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).

15

See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Child Pornography,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/childporn.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010)
(explaining that computers and the Internet has made the production and distribution of
child pornography easier); see also U.S. Dep’t of Just., Child Exploitation and Obscenity
Section, CEOS Mission, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/index.html (last visited
Mar. 10, 2010) (“CEOS is focused on waging an aggressive battle to protect children
from individuals who use computers or the United States mails to sexually abuse and
exploit them.”).

16

Posting of Cy.Talk Blog, Pornography Industry is Larger than the Revenues of the Top
Technology, http://blog.cytalk.com/2010/01/web-porn-revenue/ (Jan. 1, 2010).
17

Id.

18

Press Release, Internet Filter Review, TopTenReviews Releases Porn Industry
Statistics (Feb. 6, 2004), available at http://www.toptenreviews.com/2-6-04.html.
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resources allocated to protecting children from sexual exploitation,
including child pornography possession.19
II. THE SENTENCING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS
[8]
Just as the manner in which child pornography crimes are
committed varies, the punishments imposed for the variety of crimes in
this category differ greatly. The production of child pornography carries a
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, with a maximum of thirty
years imprisonment.20 The distribution and receipt of child pornography is
punishable by a mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment but can
be punished up to twenty years.21 Simple possession of child pornography
carries a maximum of ten years imprisonment.22 All of these punishments,
however, can be aggravated for repeat offenders.23 For instance, the
minimum sentence for the possession of child pornography by someone
with a previous conviction of certain other sex offenses increases to ten
years and carries a maximum of twenty years imprisonment.24 In the
federal system, the common thread between all of these punishments is a
steady increase in punishment,25 often without much explanation and even
less study.

19

Numerous agencies, initiatives, and programs have been created to combat sex offenses
against children, especially pornography offenses, such as: the Nat’l Ctr. for Missing and
Exploited Children (www.missingkids.com); the Internet Crimes Against Children Task
Force (www.icactraining.org); and the Innocent Images Project (www.fbi.gov/
publications/innocent.htm).
20

18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2006).

21

18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1).

22

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).

23

18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e), 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1), 2252A(b)(2).

24

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).

25

For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) was amended in 2003 to increase the maximum
punishment for distributing or receiving child pornography from fifteen years to twenty
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A. The Upward Trend of Child Pornography Punishment26
[9]
The Sentencing Commission explains that “numerous legislative
changes (particularly statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum
sentences) and amendments to the sex offense guidelines (e.g., increased
base offense levels) have resulted in substantial sentence increases for
[sex] offenders.”27 Before the enactment of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in 1987, there was no statute criminalizing the simple
possession of child pornography.28 Within three years, Congress made the
possession of child pornography a federal crime.29 The Sentencing
Commission subsequently created a new Guidelines section, § 2G2.4,
which assigned a base offense level of ten for simple possession.30 Under
this section, an offender would receive a two-level enhancement for
possessing images of a prepubescent or minor under twelve years old.31

years for first time offenders. PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 103(B)(i),
117 Stat 650 (2003).
26

This Article often refers to “simple possession”. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) also
criminalizes the receipt of child pornography. It is unclear how one can receive without
ever possessing, though it is possible for the producer of the child pornography to possess
it without receiving it. However, simple possession refers to the possession of child
pornography without the intent to distribute it. Therefore, in cases other than the producer
of the pornography, the distinction between simple possession and receipt is unclear. See
United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 2009). This Article focuses on
simple possession in an effort to simplify the language used to describe the offense of
having child pornography in one’s possession without any manifested intent to distribute
it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5).
27

UNITED STATES SENT’G COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 116 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
booker_report/booker_report.pdf.
28

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2009).

29

See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-647, §§ 323(a)–(b), 104 Stat. 4789,
4818–19.
30

Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 56 Fed. Reg. 1846, 1863 (Jan. 17,
1991).
31

Id.
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Although these changes took effect on November 1, 1991,32 by November
27, there was already a significant change to the Guidelines governing the
punishment of child pornography offenses, including the sentence
calculation for possession.33 As a result of a Senate Bill introduced while
most senators were in committee meetings, the base offense level for
simple possession of child pornography increased to thirteen, and added a
new, two-level enhancement for the possession of ten or more items.34
House Resolution 1240 led to another set of increases in these penalties
that took effect in 1996.35 The new base offense level for possession of
child pornography was fifteen, and another two-level enhancement—this
time for possession as a result of computer use—was added to the list of
existing enhancements.36
[10] The computer enhancements seemingly took on a mind of their
own—one divorced from the stated legislative purpose of “help[ing] our
law enforcement efforts in this area keep pace with changing technology
by increasing the penalties for the use of computers in connection with the
distribution of child pornography.”37 In reality, the computer
enhancements are out of touch with the actual effects of “changing
technology” when it comes to the criminal world of child pornography.38
Because the steady increase in the Guidelines for child pornography
possession had a lot to do with enhancements given for possessing child
pornography on computers, it is important to understand how the

32

Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C amend. 372 (2009).

33

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C amend. 436.

34

See 137 CONG. REC. S10322 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Helms).

35

See Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-71, 109 Stat.
774.
36

Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,306 (May 6, 1996).

37

See 141 CONG. REC. S5519 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).

38

The change in the methods of possessing child pornography that are due to
advancements in technology will be discussed in Part III.
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computer enhancements have greatly affected and complicated today’s
Sentencing Guidelines for child pornography possession.
[11] The first complication took place in 2000, when the Commission
was directed to clarify the term “item” in the child pornography
Guidelines to include a computer file.39 Consequently, the two-level
increase that child pornography possessors could incur for ten or more
items would apply to computer files, in addition to the two-level increase
for computer usage. By 2003, simple possession, still carrying a base
offense level of fifteen, carried a possibility of five enhancements for
specific characteristics of a defendant.40 In addition to the enhancements
already mentioned, there was also a four-level enhancement if material
portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct, or other violence, as well as
several enhancements related to the number of images possessed.41 Images
were differentiated from items, with an item being capable of holding
several images.42 Thus, a computer file counting as one item that could
potentially hold several images depicting child pornography. According to
the new § 2G2.4: 10 to 150 images warranted a two-level enhancement;
150 to 300 images led to a three-level enhancement; 300 to 600 images
resulted in a four-level enhancement; and more than 600 images would
increase a base offense level by five levels.43 Though a clarification
regarding the potential for item/image double counting was made in
2004,44it did not simplify the calculation or lessen the punishment for
child pornography possessors.
[12] To comply with the new, higher mandatory minimums and
statutory maximums set forth by the PROTECT Act of 2003, the

39

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C amend. 592 (2009).

40

See id. at amend. 649.

41

Id.

42

Id. at amend. 592.

43

Id. at amend. 649.

44

Id. at amend. 664.
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Sentencing Commission made major changes to the child pornography
guidelines in 2004.45 The Act removed the two-level enhancement for ten
or more items, but increased the base offense level for simple child
pornography possession to eighteen.46 The relevant portions of U.S.
Sentencing Guideline § 2G2.2—the new and current guidelines for child
pornography possession—are as follows:
Base Offense Level: 18
Enhancements for Specific Offense Characteristics:
1) If the material involved a prepubescent minor or
a minor who had not attained the age of 12 years, increase
by 2 levels;
2) If the offense involved material that portrays
sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of
violence, increase by 4 levels;
3) If the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity
involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,
increase by 5 levels;
4) If the offense involved the use of a computer or
an interactive computer service for the possession,
transmission, receipt, or distribution of the material, or for
accessing with intent to view the material, increase by 2
levels;

45

See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2006); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app.
C amend. 664 (2009).

46

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C amend. 664.
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5) If the offense involved:
a) at least 10 images, but fewer than 150,
increase by 2 levels;
b) at least 150 images, but fewer than 300,
increase by 3 levels;
c) at least 300 images, but fewer than 600,
increase by 4 levels; and
d) 600 or more images, increase by 5 levels.47
[13] In his article, “Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A
Primer on the Flawed Progression of the Child Pornography Guidelines,”
Troy Stabenow uses “two hypothetical, but statistically typical
defendants” to clearly demonstrate how the current Guidelines for child
pornography possession operate, and how those Guidelines have changed
over time.48 In Stabenow’s hypothetical, both defendants are convicted of
possessing child pornography and sentenced pursuant to § 2G2.2.49
Stabenow gives the second hypothetical defendant the following specific
offense characteristics and indicates the percentage of real-life child
pornography possession offenders who share those characteristics:
1) Possessed a picture depicting a child under the age of 12
(93.5%);
2) Used a computer to obtain the image (93.1%); and

47

Id. § 2G2.2.

48

See TROY STABENOW, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL STUDY: A PRIMER ON
FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 1–2, 27 (2009),
available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/child%20porn%20july%20revision.pdf.

THE

49

Id. at 27–28.

12

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 3

3) Had one disk containing two movie files and 10 pictures,
equating to 160 pictures (38% had at least 150 pictures,
63.1% had greater than 10 images).50
[14] The second hypothetical defendant “pleads guilty in a timely
fashion and receives the maximum standard reduction for acceptance of
responsibility,” even though he “has no criminal history and has never
abused or exploited a child.”51 The Guidelines ranges that would apply to
Stabenow’s second defendant at the key stages of the child pornography
guidelines’ development are:
1)

April 30, 1987: No punishment - not illegal.

2)

November 1, 1991: 6-12 months.

3)

November 27, 1991: 12-18 months.

4)

November 1, 1996: 21-27 months.

5)

April 30, 2003: 30-37 months.

6)

November 1, 2004: 41-51 months.52

In sum, the Commission directed courts to impose a sentence of, at most,
one year of imprisonment for child pornography possession in 1991, and
that directive increased to over four years in prison thirteen years later.53
[15] To add to Stabenow’s example, consider how each applicable
enhancement moves the hypothetical defendant from one sentencing range
to another under today’s Guidelines. With a base offense level of eighteen
and a criminal history category of I, the defendant would have a

50

Id. at 28.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 28–29.

53

See id. at 29.
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Guidelines range of twenty-seven to thirty-three months of
imprisonment.54 The two-level enhancement for possessing an image
depicting a child under twelve-years-old increases the Guidelines range to
thirty-three to forty-one months of imprisonment.55 Additionally, the twolevel enhancement for the use of a computer takes the applicable range up
to forty-one to fifty-one months of imprisonment.56 Finally, the three-level
increase for having 150 to 300 images raises the Guidelines range to fiftyseven to seventy-one months of imprisonment.57
[16] This progression shows that a few enhancements that apply in most
child pornography possession cases take the possible Guidelines sentence
from just over two years to nearly six years. If there were developments
made over the years suggesting that such an increase was necessary to
affect the goals of punishment, then this progression might not be
disturbing. But there is no information from the Sentencing Commission
indicating that the steady increase was warranted by the purposes of
sentencing that have been identified by Congress: punishment, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.58 In fact, at many points within this

54

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.5, pt. A (2009).

55

See id.

56

See id.

57

See id.

58

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) Specifically, the section states that the sentencing
court shall consider
the need for the sentence imposed: (A) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment
for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D)
to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner . . . .
Id. Congress has directed the Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing practices
that meet these purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2006).
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upward progression of the child pornography guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission criticized the direction Congress was taking, especially when
it came to the computer enhancements.59 The Commission stressed, “[n]ot
all computer use is equal,” and suggested Congress “develop a more
finely-tuned system of apportioning punishment in cases involving the use
of computers.”60 Recently, a growing number of district judges are
demonstrating their disagreement with the increased, unreasoned
sentences by apportioning punishment without deference to the Sentencing
Commission.
B. The Judicial Response
[17] District judges are speaking out about their belief that the
Guidelines treat child pornography crimes, especially possession,
unreasonably harsh. A series of regional, public hearings held by the
Sentencing Commission between 2009 and 2010 provided the perfect
stage for judges to air such grievances.61 In her remarks at the U.S.
Sentencing Commission public hearing in November 2009, Western
District of Oklahoma Judge Robin J. Cauthron stated:
The Guideline sentences for child pornography
cases are often too harsh where the defendant’s crime is
solely possession unaccompanied by an indication of
“acting out” behavior on the part of [the] defendant. It is
too often the case[,] that a defendant appears to be a social
misfit looking at dirty pictures in the privacy of his own

59

See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES AGAINST
CHILDREN 30 (1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/scac.pdf. In the 1996
Report to Congress, after the introduction of computer enhancements, the Sentencing
Commission questioned why Congress made the increase without any legislative record
to explain the reasoning. See id. at 30 n.23.
60

Id. at 29–30.

61

See generally Public Hearing Testimony & Transcript: 2009–2010 Regional public
Hearings, available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings.htm.
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home without any real prospect of touching or otherwise
acting out as to any person.62
Judge Cauthron recognized child pornography as “foul,” but still
questioned the sensibility of the computer enhancements;63 stating: “As
widespread as computer use is now, enhancing for use of a computer is a
little like penalizing speeding but then adding an extra penalty if a car is
involved.”64
[18] During that same public hearing, Eastern District of Louisiana
Judge Jay C. Zainey took issue with the statutory minimums applicable to
child pornography cases.65 Judge Zainey referred to the effects of those
minimums as “too harsh in certain circumstances,” especially when it
comes to first offenders.66 Though Judge Zainey analyzed the
congressionally mandated statutory minimums and not the Guidelines
themselves,67 the continual increases of the applicable Guidelines for child
pornography offenses were promulgated to comply with congressionally
imposed statutory minimums and other directives.68

62

Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 5 (Nov. 2009) (statement of Robin J.
Cauthron, Judge, W.D. Okla.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/
20091119/Cauthron.pdf.
63

Id. at 5–6.

64

Id. at 6.

65

Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 1–3 (Nov. 2009) (statement of Jay C.
Zainey, Judge, E.D. La.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/
20091119/Zainey.pdf.
66

Id. at 3.

67

Id. at 1–3.

68

See supra Part II.A.
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[19] Just four months earlier, at another hearing in this series of
regional public hearings, Western District of New York Judge Richard J.
Arcara gave a statement questioning the purpose of the many
enhancements that could be applied to child pornography cases, especially
in the cases of possession.69 Specifically, Judge Arcara asked: “Is the
person who downloads hundreds of images indiscriminately more
dangerous than one who downloads 50 or 60 specific kinds of images?”70
By noting that “numerous enhancements apply to every child pornography
offender;” Judge Acara questioned whether the Guidelines “assist the
Court in identifying factors that distinguish a defendant who is a threat to
the community and likely to reoffend from one who is not.”71 Throughout
this hearing and the other regional public hearings, other judges also
mentioned that the Commission ought to reexamine the sentences for child
pornography offenses.72 Western District of Pennsylvania Judge Donetta

69

Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 8–9 (July 2009) (statement of Richard
J. Arcara, Judge, W.D.N.Y.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/
Arcara_Testimony.pdf.
70

Id. at 8–9.

71

Id. at 9.

72

See, e.g., Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 5 (Nov. 2009) (statement
of Edith H. Jones, Chief Judge, 5th Cir.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20091119/Jones.pdf (noting that the Guidelines are unevenly applied in the
case of child pornography offenses); Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 1
(Oct. 2009) (statement of Robert W. Pratt, Chief Dist. Judge, S.D. Iowa), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20091020/Pratt_Testimony.pdf
(“Sentences
are
routinely more harsh and punitive than they need to be, especially in run-of-the-mill . . .
pornography cases.”); Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 4–5 (July 2009)
(statement of Nancy Gertner, Dist. Judge, Mass. Dist. Ct.), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/Gertner_Testimony.pdf
(noting
that
departures in pornography cases indicate problems with the Guidelines); Federal
Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Reg’l
Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 11 (July. 2009) (statement of Jon O.
Newman, Cir. Judge, 2d Cir.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/
Newman_testimony.pdf (criticizing the enhancements for child pornography offenses);
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W. Ambrose nicely summarized this position by stating that in many child
pornography cases, “strict application of the Sentencing Guidelines would
create an injustice.”73
[20] Now that sentencing judges are not bound to sentence within the
Guidelines range, the sentiments of district judges are played out in
several child pornography sentencing decisions. For example, in United
States v. Booker,74 the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory
and directed circuit courts to review sentences for “unreasonableness.”75
In Booker and several follow-up cases, the Court explained that, in
fashioning a reasonable sentence, a district judge must properly calculate
the applicable Guidelines range and then tailor a sentence that satisfies the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).76 In doing so, the

Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 3 (May 2009) (statement of Susan Oki
Mollway, Dist. Judge, Dist. Of Haw.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/
20090527/Mollway_testimony.pdf (stating her concern about the “disproportionately
high” child pornography sentences); Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 2
(Feb. 2009) (statement of Gregory A. Presnell, Dist. Judge, Dist. Of Fla.), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090210/Presnell_statement.pdf (explaining that
courts afford less deference to the child pornography Guidelines because they are
“inherently illogical” and “not based on any empirical data [sic] or institutional
analysis”).
73

Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 6 (July 2009) (statement of J. Donetta
W. Ambrose, Chidf Judge, W.D. Pa.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/
20090709/Ambrose_testimony.pdf.
74

543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).

75

Id. at 261.

76

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60; see also Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). The § 3553(a) sentencing factors include: (1) the
kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of
offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines;
(2) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; (3) the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; (4) the need to provide restitution to victims;
(5) the requirement to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense,
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sentencing court must consider the applicable Guidelines range, but the
sentencing court may chose to sentence the defendant outside of that
range, when a Guidelines sentence would not satisfy the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors.77 The Court clarified in Kimbrough v. United States78
that a district court is also free to sentence a defendant outside of the
applicable Guidelines range based on the district court’s determination
that the policy underlying that range makes the range out of line with the
sentencing factors.79 Several district judges have been exercising this
discretion in sentencing child pornography offenders.
[21] Approximately twenty-seven percent of offenders sentenced under
§ 2G2.2 in 2007 received a sentence below the applicable Guidelines
range.80 A year later, this number was up to approximately thirty-six
percent sentenced below the Guidelines range.81 Of course, several critics
have taken issue with what these below-Guidelines sentences imply: that
the Guidelines often lead to unreasonably long sentences for child
pornography offenders. These critiques are levied even in the cases of
possession without any evidence of physical child abuse by the possessor.
[22] Some critics argue that the case against the child pornography
possession guidelines fails to appreciate “the true nature of the crime and

promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect
the public, and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training and medical care. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
77

See Gall, 522 U.S. at 49–50.

78

522 U.S. 85, 111 (2007).

79

See id. at 108–11.

80

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, TABLE 28: SENTENCES RELATIVE TO THE GUIDELINE RANGE BY
EACH PRIMARY SENTENCING GUIDELINE FISCAL YEAR 2007, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/2007/
Table28.pdf (showing that the twenty-seven percent calculation was determined by
adding together those sentences that were labeled “Downward Departure” as well as
those labeled “Below Range” on the Table 28).
81

Id.
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the harm caused” by the offender.82 At the heart of such arguments is the
claim that child pornography possession itself hurts the children in the
images and that the possession of child pornography is often a precursor to
or evidence of past abuse of children by that particular offender.83 For
instance, Alexander Gelber, Assistant Deputy Chief in the CEOS, takes
the position that viewing child pornography exploits the children in the
images and “reinforce[s] the concept that a sexual attraction to children is
normal and acceptable.”84 According to this view, possession of child
pornography is punishable because it “contribute[s] to the market demands
for more product, which means more child abuse.”85 Further, Gelber noted
a study in which convicted child pornography possessors reported “a high
incidence of previously undisclosed contact offenses against children.”86
[23] Testimony given by Ernie Allen, President of the National Center
for Missing & Exploited Children, echoed Gelber’s sentiment.87 Speaking
before the Sentencing Commission, Allen stated: “Viewing [child
pornography] is often the first step in the eventual sexual victimization of

82

ALEXANDER GELBER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RESPONSE TO “A RELUCTANT REBELLION”
16 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf.
83

See Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847,
852–54 (2008) (explaining that children are harmed by the circulation of images of their
exploitation and claiming that “the linkage between possession and molestation may be
even greater than previously thought”).

84

GELBER, supra note 80, at 5.

85

Id.

86

Id. at 6 (citing Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux:
A Report of the Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography
Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 187 (2009) (“85% [of the inmates studied] admitted
they had at least one hands-on sexual offense, a 59% increase in the number of subjects
with known hands-on offenses.”)).
87

Ernie Allen, President & CEO, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children (October
20, 2009) (Written Testimony to the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n), http://www.missingkids.com/
missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=4144
(last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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an actual child.”88 Though Allen did not suggest that this is true for all
child pornography possessors, he cited to studies which “suggest that
some population of offenders will transition from viewing child
pornography images, to needing to view more extreme images, to
offending actual children.”89 Allen further stated that even just viewing the
images without having had illegal contact with a particular minor
“undeniably revictimizes the child who initially was violated.”90 The
rationale for this position is that:
[O]nce an image is placed on the Internet, it can never be
removed and becomes a permanent record of the abuse
inflicted upon that child. Each and every time such an
image is viewed, traded, printed, or downloaded, the child
in that image is re-victimized.91
Therefore, the argument is that the harm of child pornography possession
occurs with each viewing of an image, even for offenders who are not
engaging in illegal physical contact with any children. These critics
suggest that district judges who disagree with the child pornography
Guidelines are ignoring these harms and dangers of child pornography
possession.
[24] Independent of the validity of the arguments made about the ills of
child pornography possession, it is difficult to argue that district courts are
ignoring the seriousness of this offense, even those courts that are
sentencing child pornography possessors to below-Guidelines ranges. A
glance at reasons given by district courts for imposing those below-

88

Id. at V.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id. at VI.
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Guidelines sentences discredits such a view. The oft-cited case, United
States v. Baird,92 illustrates this point.
[25] In Baird, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child
pornography and was sentenced pursuant to § 2G2.2, starting with a base
offense level of eighteen.93 Due to several enhancements, including one
for the use of a computer, as well as a downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility, the defendant’s total offense level was
twenty-three.94 The defendant did not have a criminal history, and the
resulting advisory Guidelines range was forty-six to fifty-seven months
imprisonment.95 The district court decided to impose a sentence of two
years, which was twenty-two months below the applicable Guidelines
range.96 In imposing this below-Guidelines sentence, the court
acknowledged that “possession of child pornography is a serious
offense.”97 The court agreed with the views of those who support the
increased length of child pornography Guidelines when it noted that “[t]he
primary victims of the crime of possession of pornography are the
exploited children.”98 While recognizing those harms of child
pornography possession, the court still felt that a Guidelines sentence
would be unreasonably long. The Baird court rightly concluded that the

92

According to Westlaw, United States v. Baird has been cited positively in case opinions
twenty times. It has also appeared in 93 appellate court documents, trial motions,
memoranda, and affidavits (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
93

United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 889 (D. Neb. 2008).

94

Id. at 892–93.

95

Id. at 893.

96

Id. at 895.

97

Id. at 893.

98

Id.
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harm to the victim is not the sole sentencing consideration in determining
the seriousness of the offense.99 Though most of the reasons given by the
court for imposing a sentence below the applicable Guidelines range were
specific to the offender before it,100 the court also made a general
statement about child pornography possession:
Possession of pornography is the least serious of the crimes
on the continuum of conduct – from possession to
distribution to production to predatory abuse – that exploits
children. A possessor of child pornography is considerably
less culpable than a producer or distributor of the
exploitative materials and is [sic] a marginal player in the
overall child exploitation scheme.101
Further, the Baird court described the current child pornography
Guidelines as a “response to statutory directives” rather than the result of
the “Commission’s unique institutional strengths.”102 The court found the
applicable Guidelines range to be “a less reliable appraisal of a fair
sentence.”103 This critique of the Guidelines had nothing to do with the
court misunderstanding the nature of child pornography possession or a
failure to believe that the offense was harmful. Instead, the court took
issue with the increases to the child pornography Guidelines ranges being
based on a political rather than a studied response.104 Consequently, the
Baird court chose a two-year sentence to “more closely approximate the
sentencing range that was in effect before the Sentencing Commission, in

99

Id.

100

The court discusses that the defendant’s conduct happened a number of years ago, did
not continue, and that mental health professionals had determined that he was at low risk
to reoffend and was not a pedophile. Id. at 893–94.
101

Id. at 893.

102

Id. at 894–95.

103

Id. at 894.

104

Id. at 894–95.
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response to a Congressional directive [that] collapsed the guideline
dealing with possession . . . into the guideline dealing with trafficking of
pornography . . . in 2003.”105 Thus, the court’s decision to impose a
below-Guidelines sentence reflects its recognition of a distinction between
child pornography possessors, distributors, and producers, which the court
felt was absent from the Guidelines increases.106 The reasoning in Baird—
finding the increase in child pornography possession Guidelines to be a
political, rather than an empirical response—is replicated in many cases in
which district courts sentence a child pornography possessor below the
applicable Guidelines range.107

105

Id. at 895.

106

Id. (explaining that combining the Guidelines for child pornography offenses and “the
application of significant quantity-driven enhancements for the number of images, has
served to muddy the qualitative distinctions between ‘mere possession’ and ‘distribution
of child pornography.’”).

107

See, e.g., United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 392 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing to
the method of developing the current child pornography Guidelines as a reason for them
deserving less deference); United States v. Phinney, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043 (E.D.
Wis. 2009) (“Not only is this guideline not based on Commission study or expertise, it is
directly contrary to the Commission's original, studied approach, and to several of its
subsequent recommendations and reports. Accordingly, I concluded that the range under
the 2008 guideline was worthy of little respect or deference.”); United States v. Hanson,
561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (discussing the flawed progression of the
Guidelines for child pornography offenses); United States v. Manke, No. 09-CR-172,
2010 WL 307937, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2010) (describing the child pornography
possession Guidelines as “a guideline which I and other judges across the country have
recognized is seriously flawed and accordingly entitled to little respect.”); United States
v. Cruikshank, No. 2:09-cr-00102, 2009 WL 3673096, at *4–5 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 6,
2009) (describing child exploitation offenses as pandemic yet determining that the child
pornography Guidelines were not due the same degree of deference as the Guidelines for
certain other offenses); United States v. Goldberg, No. 05CR0922, 2008 WL 4542957, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2008) (“Furthermore, there is reason to be skeptical concerning
whether the current guidelines for the specific offense with which Goldberg is charged
reflect, as originally intended, an empirical analysis by the U.S. Sentencing Commission
of judicial sentencing practices.”); United States v. Sudyka, No. 8:07CR383, 2008 WL
1766765, at *7–8 (D.Neb. Apr. 14, 2008) (finding that child pornography possession is a
serious crime and that criminalizing it is necessary to destroying the market for it, yet
giving a below-Guidelines sentence based in part on an assessment that the Guidelines
range for this offense was not reliable).
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[26] Of course, judicial divergence from the child pornography
possession Guidelines is not necessarily a reason for the Sentencing
Commission to completely revamp those Guidelines. Certainly, not all
district judges have indicated a willingness to depart from those
Guidelines based upon policy disagreements with the increases to the base
offense level and the numerous enhancements.108 Though nearly one-third
of the child pornography possession sentences are below the applicable
Guidelines range, two-thirds are not.109 However, the type of criticism
directed towards the child pornography Guidelines signals the sort of
disagreement that could lead to increased deviation from the Sentencing
Commission’s recommendations. Courts deviate from the Guidelines, not
because they find them inapplicable to a particular defendant’s situation,
but because they find them unreliable and unstudied. Thus, those
Guidelines become increasingly less relevant as a sentencing tool.
Additionally, as judges continue to speak out about their belief that the
child pornography possession Guidelines are due little deference, that
sentiment will likely be adopted by more of the bench. The danger is that
as district judges impose non-Guidelines sentences for policy rather than
individualized sentencing reasons, a guidance void will be left.
[27] This potential outcome is one that both the Sentencing
Commission and Congress should care about, and that should prompt a
closer look at the root of the problem with those Guidelines. As more
district judges indicate distrust of the child pornography sentencing
Guidelines, those judges will have to depend upon their own assessment of
what would be a categorically reasonable sentencing range for most child
pornography possessors. While trial judges may be in the best position to
tailor individualized sentences for a particular defendant within a set of
similar offenders,110 it does not mean that they are in the best position to

108

See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, No. 1:09CR154, 2010 WL 308822 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 26, 2010) (finding no merit in the criticisms of the child pornography Guidelines).

109

Id. at 7.

110

See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357–58 (2007) (“The sentencing judge has
access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant
before him than the Commission or the appeals court.”); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81, 98 (1996) (“District courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in
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determine sentencing policy.111 As the imposers of sentences, district
judges know that it is their duty to impose reasonable sentences, even if
that means breaking away from the Guidelines and attempting to set
sentencing policy on their own.112 This break would not be problematic if
district judges were systematically selecting similar sentences for child
pornography possessors and appellate judges were providing predictable
guidance on the reasonableness of sentences for child pornography
possessors. But this does not appear to be the case. Instead, the sentencing
of child pornography possessors has become quite unpredictable for both
district and appellate courts. At least some of this inconsistency is due to a
lack of uniform understanding of the role of computers and the Internet in
child pornography possession.
[28] There does not seem to be any determinable pattern in the
appellate decisions upholding and reversing child pornography possession
sentences. In United States v. Pugh, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
sentence of five years probation for a defendant convicted of child
pornography possession who had no criminal history.113 The applicable
Guidelines range mandated 97 to 120 months of imprisonment, but the

making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines
cases than appellate courts do.”).
111

See Rita, 551 U.S. at 349. (“The Guidelines as written reflect the fact that the
Sentencing Commission examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked with the
help of many others in the law enforcement community over a long period of time in an
effort to fulfill this statutory mandate.”); Kimbrough v. United States, 522 U.S. 85, 108–9
(2007) (“Congress established the Commission to formulate and constantly refine
national sentencing standards . . . carrying out its charge, the Commission fills an
important institutional role: It has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its determinations on
empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate
expertise.’”) (citing United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., concurring)).

112

See Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (explaining that a presumption of reasonableness for
Guidelines range sentences can only be an appellate presumption and district courts must
still decide whether a sentence that fall within that range reflects the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors).
113

See generally United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Eleventh Circuit concluded that, though the district court correctly
calculated the Guidelines range, “it did not give any real weight to the
Guidelines range in imposing the sentence.”114 Ultimately, the Eleventh
Circuit held that “a sentence of probation, without a single day in jail or
any period of supervised release is an unreasonable one.”115 The Eleventh
Circuit opinion in Pugh reveals that differing views of the effect of
computer usage on the offense and the offender’s culpability is at least
part of the disagreement between the district and appellate courts’
decisions. On the one hand, the district court described the defendant’s
possession of child pornography as “‘passive’ and ‘incidental’ to his actual
goal of developing online relationships . . . .”116 The Eleventh Circuit, on
the other hand, described the defendant’s illegal computer activity as
“neither isolated, unintentional nor lawful.”117 It may seem understandable
that the Eleventh Circuit would find a sentence of only probation to be
unreasonable for a defendant who “repeatedly downloaded the child
pornography images and videos at least 70 times over a period of several
years;”118 especially given the extreme explicit nature of those images.119
This position, however, does not reveal any consistent understanding
across circuits of appropriate sentences for those who possess child
pornography on computers. Surveying other circuits dealing with similar
below-Guidelines sentences shows this inconsistency.

114

Id. at 1182, 1200.

115

Id. at 1204. The period of probation did include certain terms, including that Pugh:
“(1) continue his mental health treatment; (2) not possess a computer with internet
access; (3) consent to periodic, unannounced examinations of any computer equipment he
possessed; (4) submit to searches based on reasonable suspicion; and (5) register with the
state sex-offender registry.” Id. at 1187.
116

Id at 1187.

117

Id. at 1193.

118

Id.

119

See id. at 1182.
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[29] In some circuits, probation with no term of imprisonment for a
child pornography possessor has been upheld even though the defendants’
circumstances are not much different than the defendant in Pugh.120 For
instance, in United States v. Autery,121 the Ninth Circuit upheld a sentence
of five years of probation for a child pornography possessor,
notwithstanding the defendant’s plea deal agreeing to a Guidelines range
of forty-one to fifty-one months of imprisonment.122 The defendant in
Autery was accused of having over 150 images of child pornography on
his computer, and yet the district court still agreed to a sentence with no
incarceration.123 Like the Pugh case, the defendant in Autery had no
criminal history and was not accused of having inappropriate contact with
children.124 Again, computer usage played an important role in how the
courts viewed the offense. The district court found it important that the
defendant was not using his computer to “order” a specific type of
customized child pornography, and the appellate court found this
consideration appropriate.125 Not only did both the district and circuit
courts recognize the harms created by participating in the child

120

See, e.g., United States v. Rowan, 530 F.3d. 379 (5th Cir. 2008) (court upholds a fiveyear probationary sentence with no imprisonment); United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864
(9th Cir. 2009).
121

Autery, 555 F.3d at 875.

122

Id. The conditions of the defendant’s probation were: (i) registration as a sex offender;
(ii) prohibition from viewing any pornography whatsoever; (iii) barred from being within
100 feet of places where minors congregate unless approved by his probation officer; (iv)
prohibited from travel outside the State of Oregon without prior approval; (v)
participation in mental health evaluation and counseling, including psychotherapy, and
taking any prescription drugs as directed; (vi) prohibited from possessing any firearm;
(vii) barred from using any computer except for work, or, without approval, any other
electronic media-such as a personal digital assistant or cellular phone-with Internet
capability; and (viii) prohibited from having “direct or indirect” contact with anyone
under the age of eighteen, except his own children. Id.
123

Id. at 867.

124

See Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1187; see also Autery, 555 F.3d at 867, 874.

125

Autery, 555 F.3d at 873–75.
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pornography market, but both accepted probation as a reasonable sentence
for the computer possessor.126
[30] Similar inconsistencies can be found in cases in which child
pornography possessors receive sentences involving incarceration. The
Sixth Circuit upheld a sentence of one-day incarceration and a ten-year
period of supervised release in United States v. Stall.127 The defendant in
Stall had no criminal history and possessed eighteen images of child
pornography on his computer; however, he admitted to having
downloaded child pornography over several years and viewing many more
than eighteen images.128 Ultimately, the Guidelines called for a sentence
of fifty-seven to seventy-one months incarceration.129 In imposing a
below-Guidelines sentence, the district court gave deference to the
testimony of a psychologist who explained that “internet sex offenders
were significantly less likely to fail in the community than child molesters
in terms of all types of recidivism.”130 Though the Sixth Circuit
commented that it would not have imposed the same sentence, it found
that the district court had not abused its discretion in imposing the
sentence.131 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit reversed a longer sentence for a
defendant with a lower applicable Guidelines range.132

126

Id. at 873–78.

127

581 F.3d 276, 277–78 (6th Cir. 2009). Stall pleaded guilty to receipt of child
pornography which carries the same base offense level as child pornography possession
under § 2G2.2. Id. at 278.
128

Id. at 277–78.

129

Id. at 278.

130

Id. at 279.

131

Id. at 286.

132

See generally United States v. Grinbergs, 470 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2006).
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[31] In the Eighth Circuit case United States v. Grinbergs, the
Guidelines range was forty-six to fifty-seven months, and the district court
imposed a sentence of twelve months and one day of incarceration
following the defendant’s plea of guilty to child pornography
possession.133 Just as in Stall, the nature of the defendant’s Internet and
computer usage was an important factor in the district court’s decision to
impose a below-Guidelines sentence.134 At the sentencing hearing, the
defendant presented testimony of a mental health and addiction specialist
who opined that “Grinbergs was not a typical child sex offender or a
predator but instead had fallen victim to the Internet, which provided him
with an easy outlet for his desire for attention.”135 The Eighth Circuit
found that this testimony did not make the defendant different from the
typical offender punished under the same statute.136 The Eight Circuit
subsequently held that the below-Guidelines sentence was
unreasonable.137 On appeal, the Supreme Court directed this sentence to be
reviewed in light of its newly-issued decision in Gall v. United States,
which held that district courts were not required to point to
“extraordinary” circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines
range.138 On remand, the district court again imposed the same belowGuidelines sentence.139 The district court explained that Grinbergs was not
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Grinbergs v. United States, 552 U.S. 1088 (2008) (relying on the proposition in Gall,
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United States v. Grinbergs, No. 8:05CR232, 2008 WL 4191145, at *11 (D. Neb. Sept.
8, 2008).

30

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 3

the typical child pornography offender.140 However, the district court’s
discussions about the Guidelines reveal that it also disagreed with the
child pornography possession Guidelines in general.141 The district court
shared many of the same criticisms of the child pornography possession
guidelines that this Article has previously discussed. For instance, after
explaining the harms of child pornography possession, the district court
stated: “A possessor of child pornography is considerably less culpable
than one who produces or distributes the exploitative materials and is a
marginal player in the overall child exploitation scheme.”142 The district
court also stated that “in view of the fact that the child pornography
Guidelines are statutorily-driven, as opposed to empirically grounded, the
court finds that the Guideline ranges of imprisonment are not a reliable
appraisal of a fair sentence in this case.”143 Further, the district court noted
that “the Internet has become the typical means of obtaining child
pornography” and determined that the defendant was a small player whose
computer conduct did not fall within the type of large-scale harm that the
computer enhancements were meant to punish.144
[32] All of these cases demonstrate the inconsistent guidance available
to district courts that are critical of the existing Sentencing Guidelines on
what constitutes a reasonable sentence for child pornography possession.
At times circuit courts uphold very short sentences, while at other times,
they do not. Moreover, while it is not necessarily problematic for circuit
courts to disagree about the reasonableness of sentences, the
disagreements demonstrate the void that is left when courts at either level,
are unclear as to the meaningfulness of the Sentencing Guidelines for
certain offenses. It is evident from these cases that some district courts are
finding that even “typical” child pornography possessors—first time
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offenders with no history of physically abusing children—should be
sentenced below the applicable Guidelines range. Therefore, there is a
need for a more consistent understanding of child pornography possession
and appropriate sentences for such offenders.
III. REBOOTING NOTIONS OF POSSESSION
[33] At the heart of the criticisms of the child pornography Guidelines
is the view that the increases to the base offense level and the several
enhancements do not correlate to the actual harm created by the typical
offender. The Sentencing Commission has included child pornography
possession in § 2G2.2, the Guidelines provision that also covers
production and distribution of child pornography.145 There is little
disagreement about the seriousness of child pornography possession and
the profound harm to children that each image embodies. Despite the
damage that possession of child pornography creates, courts are
recognizing possession as the lowest culpability offense on the spectrum
of child pornography offenses. Therefore, concerned district courts and
other critics of the child pornography possession Guidelines are really just
asking for the Guidelines to reflect the reality of the offense and the
offender.
A. The Realities of Child Pornography Possession
[34] Today’s child pornography possession offender looks very
different from the offender of the 1990s, when child pornography was first
criminalized. The Commission reported in 1995 that “a significant portion
of child pornography offenders have a criminal history that involves
sexual abuse or exploitation of children.”146 By 2006, however, 79.9% of
child pornography defendants had no criminal history at all, including no
145

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2010) applies the same base offense
level to various types of child-pornography possession: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A(b),
2225(a)(4), and 2255A(a)(5), as well as to distribution and production of child
pornography: 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(7).
146

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES AGAINST
CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FEDERAL PENALTIES, i
(1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/scac.pdf.
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prior sexual abuse or exploitation offenses.147 A year later, in 2007, courts
found only 5% of child pornography defendants to be involved in the
production of child pornography.148 Today’s typical child pornography
possessor is a first time offender for whom there is no evidence of child
pornography production.149 This person is quite different from the
offender who would have been sentenced under the more lenient, earlier
Guidelines. This fact makes the steady increase in the Guidelines ranges
for child pornography possession very curious.
[35] The child pornography possessor looks different today because the
manner of possessing child pornography has changed dramatically. The
U.S. Department of Justice explains that post mail was the primary means
of distributing child pornography in the 1980s.150 By 2006, however, 97%
of child pornography defendants committed the offense using a
computer.151 When it comes to child pornography possession, computers
and the Internet certainly make it easier to carry out the offense, and also
make it easier to amass more sentencing enhancements without
necessarily being a more harmful offender. For these reasons, two
evidentiary issues must be addressed to better understand the realities of
child pornography today.
[36] First, there is a question of proof that the enhancements should
even apply. Though many offenders admit to viewing and storing child
pornography on their computers, it is often unclear just how many images
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See Mark Motivans & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex
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the court should attribute to a particular offender. For example, lawenforcement officials sometimes recover portions of deleted files or pieces
of overwritten files, but it may not be absolutely evident whether or not
the defendant deleted those files or whether they were present before the
defendant received the computer.152
[37] Second, there is the issue of hidden files. When a person
downloads an image or enters a site, that person’s computer might also
unknowingly receive a type of hidden file called a thumbnails database.153
Further, when a person views a seemingly legal adult pornography
website, the website can automatically bombard the computer with
cookies and pop-ups that may include child pornography.154 Though this
all may sound like an issue of proof for conviction, because most
defendants will plead guilty, the issue of hidden files usually does not
become relevant until sentencing, where the burden of proof is only a
preponderance of the evidence.155
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See, e.g., Hollander, supra note 9, at 58 (describing a case where the state’s technician
recovered pieces of images from the defendant’s computer).
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Id. at *4; see Kathleen M. Sweeny, Internet Pornography Laws, Precedents, and
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“[i]nternet child pornography cases also involve a greater likelihood of mistake of error,
since images are frequently downloaded from Web sites in bundles, or information is
automatically downloaded to a computer with software from newsgroups or other
unscreened public areas, and therefore the potential that a defendant was not aware of the
files being on his or her computer are substantial.”).
155
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[38] These issues illustrate how computer technology often makes it
difficult to be confident in the numbers of images that should apply to the
possible Guidelines enhancements. However, even when the number of
images possessed is either clear or agreed to, it is still not apparent that the
quantity of images possessed on a computer correlates to the amount of
harm that a defendant has caused, thus warranting more enhancements and
higher Guidelines ranges. Therefore, it is useful to address how these
enhancements are often disconnected from any studied assessment of
whether or why harsher sentences are warranted for defendants with
certain characteristics.
B. Harm and Enhancements: Making the Sentencing Compute
[39] One harm created by the possession of child pornography cited by
courts, practitioner, and scholars is the possessor’s contribution to the
child pornography market.156 It is not necessary to take issue with the
contention that child pornography possessors contribute in some way to
the viability of the child pornography market to critique the position that
the Guidelines’ image enhancements for child pornography possession
capture this harm. The Guidelines’ image enhancement approach assumes
that possessing more images means that a defendant has contributed more
significantly to the child pornography market. As Southern District of
West Virginia Judge Joseph Goodwin recently pointed out, “this marketbased justification does not support the number-of-images enhancement in
section 2G2.2(b)(7).”157 Judge Goodwin questioned the connection
between number of images and the actual effect of possession on the
market.158 He concluded: “The worldwide market for child pornography is

1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1236 (4th
Cir. 1989).
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GELBER, supra note 80, at 5 (explaining that possession of child pornography is
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United States v. Raby, No. 2:05-cr-00003, 2009 WL 5173964, at *7 (S.D. W.Va. Dec.
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so vast that the relative market impact of having even 592 additional
images is miniscule.”159
[40] It is immaterial whether Judge Goodwin’s assessment is correct.
More important is his identification of perceived deficiencies in the
Guidelines resulting in him giving less credence to the Guidelines when
sentencing child pornography offenders. One deficiency is based on the
failure of the Sentencing Commission to explain how the enhancements
are in fact related to an incremental increase in the offender’s contribution
to the child pornography market in a manner that justifies the increased
sentencing range. The history of the image enhancements reveals that the
Sentencing Commission has failed to do so because the image
enhancements were based upon a brief amendment to the PROTECT Act
proposed quickly and without notification to or consultation with the
Sentencing Commission.160 The only information given by Congressman
Tom Feeney, who proposed the amendment provision adding the image
enhancements included in the “Sentencing Reform,” was that “penalties
are increased based on the amount of child pornography involved in the
offense.”161 As Representative Feeney explained, the actual focus of the
amendment was to “ensure more faithful adherence to the guidelines.”162
Thus, the image enhancements exist as unexplained sentence increases
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Id. at *2–8. The defendant in Raby was sentenced under § 2G2.2, but received a base
offense level of twenty-two rather than the eighteen level base that applies to possession
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that are not tied to the purpose of the overall amendment in which they
appear.
[41] Objecting to the Feeney Amendment, Representative Robert Scott
explained that the problem with the amendment was the lack of “hearings
or markups on this matter [which was] not the way [to] amend the
sentencing guidelines, without thought or consideration.”163
Representative Scott suggested turning the matter over to the Sentencing
Commission and further discussing it through “hearings, subcommittee
markup, [and] committee markup,” rather than deciding it on a floor
amendment.164 However, the Sentencing Committee never completed the
proposed examination and the amendment passed on the floor.165 Thus, the
sentencing enhancements advised by the Guidelines based upon number of
images possessed appears to be divorced from any study of actual increase
in harm caused by the offender.
[42] Additionally, there is that argument that, despite the effect on the
market, child pornography possession has a detrimental effect on the
victims in the images. This argument relies on studies indicating that each
viewing of an image of child abuse re-victimizes the child in that image.166
These studies report that “a significant part of the healing process for
children traumatized by sexual abuse is the ability to control the disclosure
of the abuse.”167 Accordingly, each time an offender views an image, he is
causing harm to the victim by robbing the victim of the ability to control
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access to and circulation of the depictions of the abuse.168 In sum, the
more images are viewed, the more incidences of harm caused by the
offender to the victim, and the more deserving the offender is of increased
punishment.
[43] One difficulty with this line of thought is that possession and
viewing may not be synonymous. For example, it is possible for an
offender to possess images that he has not actually seen either by
downloading directly or by accessing a file with several images or by
unknowingly downloading images that have hidden thumbnail files
associated with them.169 File-sharing, as the most popular method for
obtaining child pornography, presents another opportunity for an offender
to have access to shared files containing images that he has never seen or
even attempted to view.170
[44] Another difficulty with the argument that possessing multiple
images of child pornography increases the harm to victims is that the
description of the harm actually suggests that the damage is done in the
first instance of providing Internet accessibility to the images. The
victim’s harm arises from, and is limited to, the knowledge that “the
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See Rogers, supra note 2, at 862.
[T]he possessor causes actual harm because re-publication inflicts
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images are forever in cyberspace, able to resurface at any time.”171 The
victim does not actually know how many people have viewed or saved the
images.172 But this specific knowledge is immaterial to whether the victim
would feel harm from the potential of the images being viewed. Therefore,
in reality, one additional person possessing the images makes little
difference to the victim and is much less harmful than the initial posting of
an image to the Internet.
[45] To align with this circulation-harm argument, a more severe
Guidelines enhancement ought to apply to the person who first uploaded
the images to the Internet, whether or not that person is the producer of the
images. It is this particular offender who has made the images accessible
and able to resurface at any time. At that point, because the victim would
constantly fear that such viewing could happen at any moment, the victim
would experience the harm created by the potential of circulation, even if
the images are never viewed. Therefore, a person that actually views the
images after they have been uploaded has not added to the harm,
especially since the victim would not actually know about the number of
people viewing the image. Thus, even if the possessor has viewed all of
the images, he is not incrementally more harmful to the victim in this
manner based solely on the number of images he possesses.
[46] Once the market and re-victimization arguments are rethought, the
only reason to increase an offender’s offense level based on the number of
images possessed is the belief that viewing more images makes the
offender more deviant. With each image possessed, the offender
demonstrates an increased willingness to break the law. As already
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Of course, there could be a situation in which the victim does know how many people
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explained, it is possible to amass a large number of images on a computer
quite easily and even unintentionally. Thus, if an offender has hundreds of
child pornography images on his computer, it does not necessarily mean
that all of those images were collected individually, or that all of the
pictures were intentionally downloaded. Even if every possessor possessed
each image purposefully, the image enhancements are still not clearly
appropriate.
[47] Possessing child pornography certainly deserves punishment, but it
is unclear how having 150 to 300 images stored on an offender’s computer
necessarily makes that offender more deviant than an offender who has 10
to 150 images stored on his computer. The Guidelines treat computer
possession in the same manner that it treats traditional possession
crimes—by increasing enhancements based upon quantities of illegally
possessed items. An obvious example of this traditional approach is drug
offenses. The current Guidelines have seventeen different categories of
offense levels for various drug quantities.173 For instance, the possession
of three kilograms to less than ten kilograms of heroin gets a base offense
level of thirty-four.174 An offender would receive a base offense level of
thirty-six for possessing ten kilograms to less than thirty kilograms of
heroin.175 The base offense level would be thirty-eight for the possession
of thirty kilograms or more of heroin.176 This would result in an increase
in the applicable Guidelines ranges for a first time offender in the
following manner: 151 to 188 months for less than 10 kilograms of heroin;
188 to 235 months for 10 kilograms to less than 30 kilograms of heroin;
and 235 to 293 months of imprisonment for possessing 30 kilograms or
more of heroin.177 This effectively increases the possible Guidelines
sentence from twelve and a half years to over twenty-four years of
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incarceration for a difference of twenty kilograms of heroin. In his
statement before the Sentencing Commission, Second Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Jon Newman questioned this approach to punishment,
which he has termed “precise incremental immorality.”178 Judge Newman
explained that the issue with such an approach is that “every minute
increment of offense conduct must result in a minute increment of
punishment.”179 The difficulty of having meaningful sentencing
enhancements based upon quantity is that it is unclear how the possession
of a few more illegal items truly makes one offender different from the
offender with a few less. This is especially true with child pornography
possession when it is committed using a computer.
[48] The child pornography possessor who views and stores the images
on his computer operates very differently than the child pornography
possessor who orders the illegal materials through the mail or undertakes a
hand-to-hand purchase with the seller of child pornography in some illicit
meeting place. Imagine the person who willfully orders 200 print images
of child pornography through the mail, or the person who makes the effort
to leave his house and meet someone to purchase 200 such images and
then transport them home. Both of those offenders have to exert much
more effort and conscious decision-making than the offender who pushes
a few buttons on his computer to download those same 200 images. This is
not to say that one offender is necessarily more or less culpable than are
the others. When considering quantities, however, there is quite a
distinction. While a sentencing enhancement for the non-computer
offenders based on possession quantity may be warranted, such
enhancements for the computer offender is not related to that offender’s
culpability in the same manner. Of course, this critique is necessarily a
critique of the two-level computer enhancement. With computer use being
the typical manner in which child pornography possession manifests, and
with the low effort that is required to carry out the offense, there is a good
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argument that the sentencing enhancement should actually be applied to
the child pornography possessor who does not use a computer to carry out
the crime. In other words, a non-computer offender has to act with the
determination necessary to actually demonstrate criminal deviance. Each
of these arguments indicate a need for the Sentencing Commission to
reconsider the child pornography possession guidelines in light of the
realities of what the typical offense and offender look like today.
CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NEW SYSTEM
[49] Sentencing of child pornography possessors ought to reflect some
study of how the imposed sentences relate to the harm and danger created
by offenders. District judges are required to consider those factors in
constructing appropriate sentences, and the Sentencing Guidelines claim
to do so, as well.180 Because political trends, rather than sentencing
research, have driven the increase in the child pornography possession
Guidelines, some judges have lost confidence in their ability to guide the
court to reasonable sentences. Now that district judges are no longer
bound to follow the Guidelines, if the Guidelines are to be meaningful, the
Sentencing Commission must persuade sentencing courts that the child
pornography possession Guidelines are informative and useful. The
Commission can do this by carrying out its mandate to study and consider
appropriate sentences that reflect the purposes of sentencing recognized by
Congress.181 However, for any revisions of the child pornography
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possession Guidelines to be effective, Congress must allow the Sentencing
Commission to perform this task. Otherwise, courts will continue to depart
from the Guidelines for policy reasons, resulting in the very increase in
departures that Congress sought to avoid in recent amendments to increase
the severity of the Guidelines.
[50] Child pornography possessors deserve punishment for the harm
and danger that their offense creates and the exploitation that the offense
represents. Ultimately, however, any enhancements to child pornography
possession sentences should reflect aspects of the offense that actually
make the offender more harmful than the typical child pornography
possessor. If the harm is based on contributing to market demand for child
pornography, then the corresponding sentencing enhancement ought to
apply to those who actually contributed to that demand in some manner
that was truly more significant than other offenders. If the harm is revictimization through Internet access to the images, then only the
possessor who also posted the images to the Internet ought to receive the
enhancement. Further, any sentencing enhancements related to the notion
that the more images a person possess demonstrates their increased
willingness to break the law ought to only apply to defendants who had to
take some significant steps or form the repeated intent to amass the
additional images.
[51] All of these possible revisions must reflect the influence of
computers and the Internet on the offense in order for the sentencing
guidance to be meaningful. Once the Commission conducts a true study to
determine what makes one possessor worse than the next, and sentencing
courts can see the relationship between the offense and the applicable
Guidelines, then courts may be more likely to follow the Commission’s
suggestions. The same can be done for other child pornography offenses
beyond simple possession. Then, courts can reserve deviations from the
Guidelines for individual, offender-specific reasons. This allows for
district courts to act in their superior position of tailoring individualized

advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the
criminal justice process . . . .
Id. § 991(b)(1) (2006).
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sentences, while the Sentencing Commission can carry out the promise of
its institutional strength by setting reasoned sentencing policy.
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